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Dec., 1953
PUBLIC UTILITIES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
WAR POWERS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND TAXATION
GLENN G. SAUNDERS of the Denver Bar
This review covers the fields of public utilities, administrative
law, war powers, local government and taxation. With a single
exception it may be stated that no new principles of law have been
announced during 1953 to this time in these fields of law. This
does not mean that the Supreme Court has not been busy in these
fields, but rather that it has found occasion to apply well-estab-
lished principles to new sets of circumstances rather than finding
itself presented with new basic problems.
The single exception we find is School District No. 3 v. Perry,'
decided Nov. 17, 1952, an en banc and unanimous decision, opinion
by Mr. Justice Moore. The case had to do with the formation of
a new school district under a statute which allowed a discretion
to the County Superintendent of Schools. The statute made no spe-
cific provision for an opportunity for hearing before the exercise
of discretion by the Superintendent.
In such a case the Court held that validity of the superintend-
ent's exercise of judgment was nevertheless dependent upon his
giving those interested an opportunity to be heard. Although there
is no specific discussion of the point, of constitutional law, it does
appear that in discretionary matters public officials, whether di-
rected specifically to do so or not, should, under our ideas of due
process, afford an opportunity for a hearing to those interested
in order that the discretion may be a well-advised one.
This is in accord with a definite trend manifested by the
court in all matters involving activity by administrative and
municipal officials. It appears to be the view of our Supreme Court
that public officers ought not to lose sight of the fact that they
should exercise their powers for the advancement of the welfare
of the people they serve. Wherever a public officer exercised a tech-
nical, ungenerous view of his duties, not connected with the real
purpose for which he was supposed to operate his office, he found
the Supreme Court puting him back in his place. This happened
a number of times.
The State Board of Barber Examiners found the technical
ground for refusing to permit an experienced barber to practice
his occupation and promptly swept it aside (Battaglia, et al v.
Moore).2 In Prouty, et al v. Heron . the court found it unreasonable
for the Engineering Examiners to. limit the practice of a man to
........ Colo .......... 250 P. 2d 1010, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6.
2........ Colo........ 261 P. 2d 1017, 1952153 C.B:A. Adv. Sh. No. 5.
a........Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 755, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No: 14.
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a phase of that field called "Civil Engineering" in the absence of
any reasonable standard for such limitation.
This attitude was not wholly confined to the executive branch
of the government. When a district court endeavored to step out-
side the judicial field and enter the province of the Fish and Game
Commission, the court was held to the performance of duties as-
signed to it by law. (People ex rel Dunbar, Atty. Gen., et al v. Dis-
trict Court in and for Chaffee County).4 But on the other hand,
when the Fish and Game Departmept, through some over-zealous
employees, unlawfully seized some deer meat from a man because
he was an alien, even after they had issued a license to him to
go out and get the deer meat, the court put that department back
in its place pointing out that the legislature had not forbidden
aliens to have hunting licenses, and that it is for the legislature
to say who may hunt and not for an administrative official.
Along the same general trend of relieving the innocent and
intentionally law abiding citizen from arbitrary and unlawful
action of public officials, is the case of Peterson v. McNichols,5 in
which the City, after exacting an unlawful excise from a number
of its citizens, then passed an ordinance to pay back the money
which the Supreme Court, in an earlier case, had pointed out was
unlawfully exacted. Then the City turns around and decided its
own ordinance in which it had declared that it was simply doing
common justice and decency and equity, was unconstitutional and
void. The Supreme Court found nothing wrong with the City being
as honest as the ordinary business man would have to be and re-
quired the City to make the repayments of the funds unproperly
and unlawfully collected.
Somewhat in the same vein is Mullen Investment Co. v.
Arvada, 6 where the Supreme Court required the town to make
good every dollar of Special Improvement Tax money which it had
collected and diverted for other uses than payment of the inter-
est and principal on special improvement bonds for which the
money had been paid.
There is one very wise decision of the court, People v. Toll Gate
Sanitation District7 which really falls under a subdivision of law
which is not specifically named within the One Year Review, to wit,
the field of judicial legislation. In an opinion which cites all of
the perfectly apparent reasons why the sanitation district law
should be different than it is, but with no more than a simple quo-
tation of the actual statute involved, the court held that a person
qualified to vote is really one registered to vote.
........ Colo .......... 255 P. 2d 743, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 16.
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